Verification Code Forwarding Attack
Date: December 2015
Publication: 9th International Conference on Passwords (Passwords15 London)
Source 1: http://isis.poly.edu/~hossein/publications/VCFA_extendedversion_siadati_Nguyen_Memon.pdf
Source 2: http://engineering.nyu.edu/files/VCFA_PasswordsCon15.pdf
Abstract or Summary:
Major Internet service providers deploy SMS-based verification mechanisms to fortify the security of users' accounts for critical actions such as password reset and logging in from a new computer. In this paper, we describe a new type of phishing attack where an attacker triggers the delivery of a verification code from a service provider to a user and lures the user to forward the code to him so that he can bypass the SMS verification process. We call this a Verification Code Forwarding Attack (VCFA). The attacker can use VCFA to reset a password of a user's account or to get access to a 2-factor enabled account which he already knows its password (e.g., through leaked databases). We attribute the success of this attack to the lack of an effective and usable means for the user to verify the service provider, the lack of context for the message sent, and an assumption about users' understanding of the authentication process. To show the susceptibility of the users to such an attack, we conducted an experiment with 20 mobile phone users and found that more than 25% of users were vulnerable against this type of attack. A semi-structured interview with the subjects of the experiment and a survey of 100 subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk were done to explore possible causes for the success of this type of attack. We also discuss the possible remediation.
PasswordResearch.com Note: First link to paper is the extended version, while the second link is the short version. Video of presentation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjGbtDmSGac
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