





## Combating Common Web App Authentication Threats

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## Key Presentation Topics

- Understanding Web App Authentication
- Managing User Authentication
- Securing Session Authentication




Key Topics

# Web App Authentication Challenges

- Authentication takes place with every browser-server interaction
- HTTP natively transmits data unencrypted
- Developers often fail to understand their responsibility for good authentication design
- Attackers are getting better at defeating web app authentication systems





#### Protecting Web Content

## Protecting Web Content

- Segment protected content from unprotected
- Authenticate users prior to granting content access
- Map only appropriate user permissions or roles to content
- Don't rely on obscurity!





#### Types of Web Authentication

- Type of Web Authentication
  - HTTP integrated
    - Basic
    - Digest
    - NTLM / Kerberos
  - Form-based
    - POST delivered parameters



6



## Protecting Data with SSL

- Allows Web server to prove identity w/ certificate from trusted Certificate Authority
- Initiates encrypted communications between browser and Web server
- Supports multiple encryption algorithms for weak to stronger protection
- May be needed during entire Web session, and not just during authentication



#### User Authentication

## User Authentication

- Normally relies on username and password
- Consider using a unique, but not meaningless, username standard
  - Not Social Security numbers
  - Not overly simple/predictable numbers or names
  - Be wary of email addresses





## Enforcing Good Passwords

- Don't leave it all up to the user's discretion
- Enforce basic requirements
  - Length
  - Character Composition
  - Name and word rejection
  - Maximum lifetime
- Start with a good and unique default
  - Require change upon first login



#### Error Messages

### Authentication Error Messages

- Prevent disclosure of username match in login failure messages
  - "User account not found" or "Password incorrect"
  - *"Error retrieving/updating the SecurityUserEntity"* or
    *"User ID or password entered is not valid"*





#### Auditing Authentication Failures

## Auditing Authentication Failures

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- Log all successful and failed logins
- Alert staff when failed logins hit threshold
- Consider IP block or account lockout
- Notify user of last successful login and unsuccessful attempts



### Forgotten Passwords

- Human-centered systems for dealing with forgotten passwords are more costly
- Automated systems pose security challenges
  - View password hint
  - Provide answer to secondary secret
  - Provide answers to pre-selected questions
  - Email existing/new password to user
- Consider forcing logoff after password change



#### Password Storage

### Password Storage

- Password database should be well protected
- Obfuscate stored passwords using a one-way cryptographic hash function
- Seed hash function for greater security





#### Alternative Authenticators

## Alternative Authenticators

- Make sure that alternative means of authenticating are appropriately secure
  - Order numbers
  - Phone numbers
- Consider stronger authentication factors
  - Hardware tokens
  - Software tokens
  - Client-side certificates
  - Biometrics




### Session IDs

- Identify the user to the Web application with a temporary ID
- Usually stored and transmitted as a "cookie"
- Can be stored in the URL
- Assigned either after or prior to user authentication
- As valuable as a password



Session IDs





#### Cookie Assignment & Use

GET http://www.shopapp.com/ HTTP/1.1

Host: www.shopapp.com



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2005 19:55:04 GMT Set-Cookie: FPB=dc1hj7k1g11f288p; expires=Thu, 01-Jun-2006 19:00:00 GMT; path=/; domain=www.shopapp.com Connection: close



GET http:// www.shopapp.com/home.asp HTTP/1.1 Host: www.shopapp.com Cookie: FPB=dc1hj7k1g11f288p



Critical Factors for Strong Sessions

Strong Session IDs

- Privacy *Must be difficult to capture*
- Predictability *Must be difficult to predict*
- Key Space *Must be difficult to brute force*
- Time Window *Must be valid for limited time only*



STRATEGIC INFORMATION SECURITY

# Requirement 1: Privacy

Lack of SID Privacy Leads to Session Theft:

- 1. Obtain a valid session ID from another user's session
- 2. Substitute session ID and assume victim's

### Session ID Privacy Tips:

- Use SSL
- Use cookie flags (e.g. secure, path, non-persistent)
- Pass ID securely (e.g. Not in URL)

#### Session IDs – Predictability

Requirement 2: Very Low Predictability

Predicting A Session ID:

- Gather a number of cookies
- Find pattern; predict existing or future IDs
- Use predictions to steal user sessions

sessionID=49PAKD43301356F sessionID=49PAKD43301357F sessionID=49PAKD43301358F sessionID=49PAKD43301359F sessionID=49PAKD43301360F sessionID=49PAKD43301361F

Example: Single increment pattern. Simple to predict.



Requirement 3: Large Key Space Brute Forcing a Session ID:

- Gather a number of cookies
- Find any pattern to reduce "key space"
- Use a script to generate and test cookies

20

sessionID=49AKD494958F sessionID=49AKD483492F sessionID=49AKD459304F sessionID=50AKD431333F sessionID=50AKD412983F sessionID=50AKD463340F

Example: ID with constant, pattern, and randomized values. Brute force-able.

Session IDs – Key Space



#### Session IDs – Time Window

## Requirement 4: Limited Time Window

- Limiting the time for an attacker to brute force, predict, or steal a session
- Must balance timeframe with annoyance to user
- Associate a server-side timestamp with each session ID
- Refresh timestamp each time a request associated with the session is received
- Give users a logoff button that expires session ID





#### Hidden Parameter Manipulation

### Parameter Injection

Expected application behavior is changed by inserting parameters into a request

Common examples:

- admin=1
- Mode=debug
- discount\_code=102




## Cross–Site Scripting (XSS)

- Your application may be tricked into serving up an attacker's HTML or scripts to users
- Commonly used to steal the user's session ID
- May be used to steal username & password credentials from a form







Exploited Operation:



Gotcha..

Cross-Site Scripting

<u>Phase 1:</u> User submits name with unexpected HTML tags: Steve Rodgers<script>alert("Gotcha...")</script>

<u>Phase 2:</u> Application processes input, stores values: name= Steve Rodgers<script>alert("Gotcha...")</script> email= srodgers@securityps.com

<u>Phase 3-4:</u> Application retrieves values from database and places them on HTML page: <u>Microsoft Internet Explorer</u>

Steve Rodgers <script> alert("Gotcha") </script>	I can execute any javascript code now. Steve					
<a href="mailto:srodgers@securityps.com">srodgers@securityps.com</a>						

### XSS Solutions

## Cross-Site Scripting Solutions

- Perform data validation
  - Inspect all input for expected characters and formatting
  - Prepare all output for proper encoding
  - Build this into global app data validation library for regular reuse



## Phishing

- Act of tricking users into sending their login credentials or other info to attacker
- Must focus on user to hinder
  - Educate about communication policies
  - Stick with communication policies
  - Authenticate the organization to the user
- Make phishing easy to report



Phishing

## Summary & Call to Action

- Take initiative to implement strong user authentication now
- Investigate how web apps handle session ID generation and management
- Validate input to prevent XSS and SQL injection
- Visit www.passwordresearch.com



Summary

